






The Muslim Community through the Muslim Individual
	The philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal offers a new way of thinking about what it means to be an individual and suggests a course of action which celebrates the individual and by doing so describes what he thinks a Muslim individual (and therefore community) should be. My previous paper was an investigation into the question of individuality and the evolution of that question over time worked around a concept of individual in terms of inner unity of consciousness, self-recognition and identification, and awareness of personal agency. By framing the individual with these subcategories, I have prepared this paper to suit a discussion of what it means to be one amongst many and what collective identity is and does, and to include an explanation of how Iqbal's philosophy serves to structure a community (collective identity) through individuals (personal identity).
	The term 'collective identity' does not have an easily agreed upon definition in academic discourse, hence to stave off confusion the paper will begin with a discussion of terms and usage pertinent to the question of being in/of a community and participating in collective identity. With semantic guidelines in place, some differing arguments on the nature of collective identity will be offered and compared keeping in mind the previous discussion of individuality, and a synthesis of the issues of individual and collective identity will be offered by means of Iqbal's thought on Muslim identity.
I.	Terms
But a uniformity so universal and absolute is utterly impossible; for the immediate physical milieu in which each one of us is placed, the hereditary antecedents, and the social influence vary from one individual to the next, and consequently diversify consciousness. It is impossible for all to be alike, if only because each one has his own organism and that these organisms occupy different areas in space.​[1]​

Many thinkers on the subject “refer to Émile Durkheim's conception of conscience collective and Max Weber's notion of Gemeinschaftsglauben as the classical paradigms of collective identity.”​[2]​ Durkheim describes the collective conscience as the set of beliefs and ideas which average members of a group all have and which unite the group. In Durkheim's view, groups of people are organized and act in specific ways due to this collective conscience, which is the agent of action beyond that of individuals. Weber sees groups organized through Gemeinschaftsglauben, or community beliefs which unite by virtue of individuals acting according to those beliefs. Dirim describes Gemeinschaftsglauben using ethnicity as an example of an identity which originates in individuals but transcends economic, political, and religious bounds to form group identity; she states that ethnicities are suited for such pooling because they can be applied across all social strata and are based solely on ancestry (“Ethnie eignet sich als Mittel einer solchen Vergemeinschaftung, denn sie kann schichtenuebergreifend eingesetzt werden und basiert allein auf Herkunft.”).​[3]​ 
	Durkheim's view is one of collective identity as a totality of beliefs, while Weber describes collective identity as an aggregate of beliefs. The key difference is the placement of most agency (total in Durkheim, individual members of group in Weber), and this difference helps illustrate some of the important questions in defining collective identity: is it imposed or does it originate from within; how important is individual decision-making to the given/chosen identity; is personal identity singular or plural and where does collective identity fit in?
	To formulate possible solutions for these questions, we must “begin with a definition of terms, both the denotation of collective identity and the distinctions between collective identity and other related terms that are in common use within the social science literature (i.e., social identity, personal identity, relational identity, and social roles).”​[4]​ Ashmore describes collective identity in terms of membership in certain categories. Membership may be declared upon an individual from an external source—whether it be an observer from within or without the category being foisted upon this individual—but the category gains a kind of legitimacy as an identity signifier when the individual identifies himself as a member; “That is, although others may refer to one in terms of a particular social category, that category does not become a collective identity unless it is personally acknowledged as self-defining in some respect.”​[5]​ Though the added element of self-identification muddles the academic jargon between social and collective identity, it seems unnecessary to inflate the scope of what is 'collective' to what is 'social'. Because the word 'social' is less specific than 'collective', here I will “prefer the attribute collective to the attribute social in this expression to preclude the misinterpretation that, by implication, any other form of identity (e.g. individual identity) would necessarily be asocial.”​[6]​ Ashmore continues,
we find that the connotations of social identity are more numerous and potentially more problematic than are those of collective identity...At the same time, we do not claim that collective identity is without ambiguity. Within the literature of social movements, for example, collective identity often implies some sense of political consciousness and collective action. We consider these features to be possible rather than essential elements of collective identity (much as Simon & Klandermans, 2001, used the term politicized collective identity to denote a special form of collective identification).​[7]​

By describing collective action as an nonessential element—a potential outcome and not a necessary condition—of collective identity, Ashmore locates identity in an aggregate of individuals and their actions and actions instead of in an externally acting identity which surpasses the individuals within its category. When collective identity is considered in a more Durkheim fashion it takes on the capacity to become a movement; this kind of existence separate from the individual members of the group thereby becomes its own narrative of interaction. Collective agency (and its ability to engender a narrative), “which is the action component of collective identity, not only suggests the possibility of collective action in pursuit of common interests, but even invites such action. Thus, it can be argued that collective identity is constituted by a shared and interactive sense of 'we-ness' and 'collective agency.'”​[8]​ Because of these related complications, it is important to “stress that we use collective identity as a psychological concept, referring to the individual rather than to a group.”​[9]​ I will return to the concept of identity as an instantiation of narrative later in the paper.
	Abizadeh argues against the Hegelian explanation for collective identity, which requires first the recognition of an individual's personal identity from another source: “the recognition necessary to an individual's sense of self-hood must be external, because none of the constituent parts of the individual self would possess the independent agency needed for a normatively relevant act of recognition.”​[10]​ This implies that to be is to be other to someone else, since self-identification and self-awareness are tossed aside as irrelevant or unpersuasive grounds for personal identity claims. Though an individual cannot self-identify, his existence as an individual is given meaning when others can point to him as outside of themselves and potentially assign him to categories as they perceive are appropriate. Azibadeh reasonably concludes that “If we grant Hegel's view of self-consciousness, then the self's own internal recognition of itself as a self is dependent on external recognition.”​[11]​ This demand becomes problematic when addressing self-identification into groups and the group's identification of others (who do not necessarily self-identify the same way) as members. 
	The more subtle point about collective identity is that it does not necessarily exclude anyone: the individual implies an other if he must be identified as an individual, but “the recognition required by a collective identity can come solely from the (other) individuals who make up that collectivity—an option that would not analogously be available for the development of individual identity itself.”​[12]​ Abizadeh is concerned with showing how Hegel (nor Taylor, who provides a less stringent but similar argument) does not necessarily assume that collective identity presupposes the exclusion of some individuals;​[13]​ “the point is simply that the constitution of the collective identity via recognition or dialogue is not dependent on the existence of excluded individuals. Neither Hegel's nor Taylor's arguments necessarily commit them to the particularist thesis.”​[14]​ This point is very useful when considering what it means to be in a community and part of a collective identity; the question of a global community, human rights issues, etc. But it introduces an issue of in-group identification: if the personal identity of individuals relies on members of perhaps the same collective identity recognizing the individuals both as such and as fellow participants in this collective identity, where do personal identity and collective identity meet and is there still a distinction between them?
	To depict collective identity as growing up from the individuals and yet not superseding them, like a movement does, is to potentially conflate “collective identity and personal identity. Whereas collective identity is explicitly connected to a group of people outside the self, personal identity typically refers to characteristics of the self that one believes, in isolation or combination, to be unique to the self.”​[15]​ In this model the categories to which individuals belong have far less emotive power than do the beliefs and ideas individuals describe as unique. Separating what is personal and what is collective comes down to, then, perceived uniqueness of characteristics (including having certain beliefs and ideas as characteristics of an individual, not limited to physical). Hall discusses emotive power of self-identification into a category (not limited to just one) by referring to Kratochwil and Bloom:
Both Friedrich Kratochwil and William Bloom have illuminated the relationship between individual identity and collective identity in their analyses of the sociology of Durkheim. Kratochwil stresses Durkheim’s investigation of the emotive content of social life...In other words, one identifies with those and that which one loves and cherishes, which are familiar and comfortable. We do not develop strong feelings for individuals and things with which we are unfamiliar. That which threatens our objects of affection, or our relationship with them, become objects of our aggression.​[16]​

A number of problems arise with such a system: collective identity seems little more than accident; self-identification into categories would be self-defeating; and due to these factors it would likely lead to a feeling of alienation. 
	Durkheim's collective conscience organizes, acts, and motivates from without the individual. Weber's Gemeinschaftsglauben organizes, acts, and motivates from within the individuals. In Ashmore's view, collective identity has shriveled up into the accidental similarities which cannot be claimed as unique; perhaps this is a motivator to two extremes—attempting to blot out that which is perceived as unique in order to self-identify into wider categories, or scrambling to round up every belief and idea perceived as unique in order to maintain a strong sense personal identity. Either way, Ashmore's view polarizes lives into a very difficult internal/external, me/them, I/not-I framework which would appear to either strongly discourage self-identification into categories in order to preserve perceived uniqueness or strongly discourage perceiving uniquenesses in the self and therefore rendering self-identification into categories meaningless. What is lost in each instance is the capacity to see oneself simultaneously as a self and as a self amongst (rather than against) other selves.
	One argument for how to connect collective and personal identity is through socialization, which Hall describes as a “process by which we become familiar with and habituated to people, places, environments and institutions...Socialization is not, in this context, a remorseless selection mechanism through which successful societal socializers are selected for survival by imitating successful behavior.”​[17]​ The idea of habituating oneself to a certain group or environment may appear to be an easy out, as it were—those who link personal and collective identity by becoming familiar with their surroundings succeed. However, Hall's statement indicates that socialization is not aping the behaviors touted as successful, but rather developing a relationship of familiarity and comfort with other people and one's environment. Taylor notes that “identity formation occurs through a linguistically mediated process of socialization. For an individual, socialization requires interaction with external others.”​[18]​ Interaction here can be dialectic between individuals or a more metaphorical dialogue between the individual and his environment. This familiarity provides a sense of shared characteristics or experiences which link individuals to one another who otherwise may not self-identify into the same groups. Socialization, then, is the connection between personal and collective identity which dampers polarization between them.
	The most significant problem with the explanation of socialization is that it depicts personal identity as fully internal and collective identity as an external entity in which the individual involves himself; socialization has only blurred the line between personal and collective, not linked them together. The argument could be stronger if behavior resulted from socialization were described in a different way: by attributing the link between personal and collective to “the process of the socialization of the individual into the behavioral norms of his or her society,” Hall maintains that behaviors indicating familiarity and comfort are absorbed by the individual and later displayed, apparently indicative of a perceived connection between the personal and collective.​[19]​ To expound a more consistent view with that of Weber/Ashmore/Hall collective identity (which precedes, of course, the distinction here), one could argue that the behaviors which indicate solidarity between members of a group (like certain greetings, affection, etc) rise from the individuals organically as a result of the other characteristics shared with the group members. For example, a group consists of people with strong beliefs about animal welfare. A behavioral norm in the group is to stop driving when a turtle is in the road and let it finish crossing. Self-identification into this group would have much more emotive content if the individual already engaged in this activity and happened upon a group whose members also waited for the poor turtle. In this instance, the individual would be recognizing his belief, which he previously perceived as unique, as a shared belief in a group; therefore, self-identification as a member of the group is a natural outgrowth of the individual's preexisting, reflected-upon personal identity. “Through emotive identification (emotional attachment) and the forces of socialization, our individual identity—our ideas about who we regard ourselves to be—are derived in a social context. Individual identity and collective identity are co-constituted.”​[20]​
	A further complication, which will be addressed later in the paper in more detail, is that of religious identification. Specifically, the self-identification as Muslim and the relationship between personal and collective identity which follows. Religious identification, and Muslim self-identification especially, appears to conflate collective and personal identity on a regular basis. Iqbal's philosophy offers a means of self-affirmation which results (from its nature) in affirmation of the community through and by the individual. I suggest that this conception of personal identity excellently articulates what it means to self-identify as Muslim because it sacrifices neither personal nor collective identity but rather celebrates both and seeks to enhance them through one another. The argument Iqbal makes about personal and collective identity is much stronger than Weber, bypasses the polarization of Ashmore, and fits much more closely with (Muslim) religious identity due to its ontological conception of individuals as potentially transcendent and conviction that the self should be continuously affirmed.
	Polletta concludes, 
To avoid overextension of the concept, we have defined collective identity as an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.​[21]​

This definition best fits into the academic literature for collective identity while avoiding the major pitfalls discussed above. It also allows for discussion of religious identity as both personal and collective without sacrificing the meaningfulness or salience of either one.
II. Discussion
	Collective action was addressed briefly in the previous section to illuminate the landscape of self-identification and personal agency related to collective agency. This issue has further bearing on the discussion of collective agency because it brings ontology to the forefront of the conversation. As the literature currently reflects, there are longstanding academic battles for conceptual ground—ontology has been severed from action insofar as ontology is not considered the purview of sociologists. Instead, most discussion of action in sociology makes use of social order and structure to form arguments. Somers notes that delineating the conceptual ground in this way “deprives sociologists of the deeper analysis that is possible to achieve by linking the concepts of action and identity. To get these benefits, however, we must reject the decoupling of action from ontology.”​[22]​ The absurdity of taking ontological discussion out of action comes out of what it means to have agency. As discussed in the previous paper, to understand and utilize the capacity individuals have for action, they must first be aware of themselves and conceive of themselves as agents (with a measure of efficacy). The initial stage of realizing potential for action is self-awareness and identification of one's own consciousness as singular. Somers' observation that “some notion of social being and social identity is...incorporated into each and every knowledge-statement about action, agency, and behavior” gets at this point.​[23]​ Her observation is still weaker though, than the claim that to conceive of oneself (not as a member of a group, but as a self) requires a definitive ontological statement—that is, to have an idea that I have beliefs, can act on beliefs, and can identify with others who do the same, I must know the I as a certain kind of being. This ontological project is what sociologists have been avoiding and what gives the academic discussion surrounding action in sociology an uncomfortably narrow scope. Somers agrees that “it is unlikely we can interpret social action if we fail to also emphasize ontology, social being, and identity.”​[24]​
	By virtue of the individual's conception of himself as a unified consciousness with awareness of his own agency, persons are actors (agents). To be human, by these ideas of identity, is to act. One's ontological status is inseparable from the capacity and propensity to act. To act one must have a “multifaceted notion of the self. It is a self defined by...its associated ideals of self-responsible freedom and dignity—of self-exploration, and of personal commitment.”​[25]​ Iqbal argues that through action, individuals gain a deeper understanding of themselves because they constantly test the bounds (ontological, spiritual, physical) of other objects and people against their action and therefore against themselves. His philosophy consistently regards self-knowledge as the gateway to action and action as the means to acquire more self-knowledge. In this way being an individual is being active and gaining knowledge systematically and repeatedly. Accordingly, the self is intrinsically driven to develop itself as a causal power in order to engage more fully with its own being. Only “the sense of striving and the experience of purposive action and the success which I actually achieve in reaching my ‘ends’…convince me of my efficiency as a personal cause,” and therefore, without purpose the self is inactive and thereby loses its sense of identity as an active power.​[26]​ Every action involves an ontological statement deriving from self-knowledge, which Iqbal expresses as “the recipient of Divine illumination is not a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding.”​[27]​ Individuals add to and instantiate new environments through action, as Iqbal argues by saying that the self is developed by “tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego.”​[28]​ This process of continual growth and testing is the heart of self-affirmation for Iqbal and provides the basis for his ideas about the community and the individual's relationship with it. 
	Taylor describes a similar process of self-identification and self-knowledge, “requiring a radical reflexivity” as “the basis for a certain conception of inwardness…another development, the rise of our modern notions of nature, and their roots in what I call the affirmation of ordinary life.”​[29]​ Iqbal's philosophy points to the potentialities in each individual to become the ultimate person, and in doing so does celebrate the humanness of human being. The reflexivity which Iqbal advocates is not on a future or past version of the self, but on the self as it is in its action at the moment. He does not suggest that the journey of self-affirmation is without end or that the end is unreachable or that end is annihilation of the individual—every step in his proposed teleology focuses on encouraging and celebrating the individual as a certain kind of self-affirming person. 
	Iqbal remarks, “whatever may be the final fate of man it does not mean the loss of individuality.”​[30]​ Because the potential for self-knowledge and (through self-knowledge) ultimately knowledge of God is open to any person just by virtue of their being human, Iqbal is affirming ordinary life, in the sense that it is not just for a Moses to be like Sinai. There is enormous potential within each person to reach that utmost level of being, which he calls vicegerency. This individual's actions, knowledge, and existence, become a matter of collective identity in the Muslim community because he is acting out and representing the will of God in the world. For this reason, the individual who Iqbal would call a vicegerent is continually living and reinterpreting the Shari'a, which is meant to express the will of God through law. Iqbal published Asrar-i Khudi (Secrets of the Self) in 1920, and in it he describes the nature and goodness of human life and that which makes it distinctive and powerful—the desire and capacity to act:
Life is preserved by purpose:
Because of the goal its caravan-bell tinkles.
Life is latent in seeking,
Its origin is hidden in desire.
Keep desire alive in thy heart,
Lest thy little dust become a tomb.​[31]​

The first two lines show how personal identity (expressed through action) is maintained and sustained by pursuit of a teleological end, which fits into Iqbal's insistence that individuals affirm themselves by acting. Because the individual drives onward continually toward vicegerency, he is always shaping his environment. Iqbal uses the image of the caravan to show how this developing individual leads others and motivates them onward, like the caravan-bell. To remain alive and pulsing with the force of life, the individual involves himself in the collective identity of those around him by virtue of his influential and motivational action. 
III.	Religious Collective Identity
	The next question after awareness of agency is, of course, what to do? Here the multidimensional conception of identity offers another perspective on the personal and collective—by taking up one's agency and affecting the environment (be it physical, emotional, etc) elements of behavioral norms must come into play, be they in line with or working against the chosen action. Through action the individual makes a statement about existing norms within his group and either buttresses or challenges those norms. Either option includes an element of actively participating in the collective identity with which the individual has already self-identified as a natural outcome of the individual's personal identity. 
Identities are not closely tied to single issues or symbols; people hold multiple identifications, some more strongly than others, and they use these flexibly according to circumstance. In this context these identifications are also expressions of cultural hybridity, where a variety of historical, international, ideological and political factors influence expressions of self-hood, belonging and relationships with others (Modood et al, 1994). People have created cultural spaces through which they express a variety of different and competing identity claims. Further, these identifications are far from ethereal, disconnected from questions of power, structured inequalities and history, since they are rooted in collective experiences of migration, diaspora and racism.​[32]​

This description of collective identity offers the possibility of seeing the self in and through virtually limitless collective identities; “discrete identities” which “may be thought of as ordered in a salience hierarchy.”​[33]​ By not limiting the collective identities in which individuals participates, the author has liberated personal identity into expression of so many other identities and allowed it to coexist alongside collective identity, as its facilitator and the source of collective agency. The intensity to which an individual self-identifies into a group creates a hierarchy of collective identities which may, in political or economic (amongst many other) ways contradict each other at some point. 
	Wendt suggests that “the extent to which and manner in which social identities involve an identification with the fate of the other (whether singular or plural)” structures the relationship between the individual and the collective in terms of “identification”, which “is a continuum from negative to positive—from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self.”​[34]​ The different collective identities with which the individual may self-identify need to be organized in this way so that the individual is never sacrificing personal identity in order to become subsumed in a larger one. This is a potential question for individuals who perceive religious identity as an element of their identity, because “As individuals become more committed to a given role, that role will assume higher identity salience. Moreover, the higher the identity in the salience hierarchy, the more likely that identity will be enacted in a given situation, or in many situations.”​[35]​ It is likely that religious identity will factor high in a salience hierarchy, and Muslim self-identification in particular dominates all other collective identities for that individual due to its intense focus on continual ritualized remembrance of the divine (highly structured prayer) and the overflow of personal identity resulting in border-defying collective identity as described by Iqbal (Ummah Wahida). Peek concludes, “In essence, this probability of invoking a particular identity, whether intentionally or not, defines identity salience and thus commitment to that identity.”​[36]​
	Religious identity is personal, collective, social, provides boundaries within which individuals may act, and allows individuals to emplot themselves in a sweeping narrative. Somers argues that “people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories.”​[37]​ Religious identity must be self-identified into in order to provide meaningful emplotment, in which personal identity becomes part and parcel of the wide and lengthy narrative of many other individuals who instantiate the religious identity as it exists in each present time. “Identity salience, which recognizes contributing factors and processes that make one identity--in this case, being Muslim--of greater, even paramount, importance in the hierarchy of multiple identities that comprise a sense of self,”helps to explain why religious identity guides decision-making so reliably for religious individuals.​[38]​ Individuals who give identity salience to religious identity comprehend their self-awareness and interaction with other individuals and the environment through their emplotment in the religious narrative; no less for the religiously-identified individual is experience “constituted through narratives; that people make sense of what has happened and is happening to them by attempting to assemble or in some way to integrate these happenings within one or more narratives.”​[39]​ Emplotment into the religious narrative gives individual agency context; Somers states, “stories guide action.”​[40]​ This assertion is consistent if read to mean that stories, i.e. narratives, motivate action in order to preserve their narration—individuals within the narrative drive the continuously emplotted events and shape the direction and meaning of the narrative. She describes the changing academic discourse on identity as
the shift from a focus on representational to ontological narrativity. Philosophers of history, for example, have previously argued that narrative modes of representing knowledge (telling historical stories) were representational forms imposed by historians on the chaos of lived experience...More recently, however, scholars...are postulating something much more substantive about narrative: namely, that social life is itself storied and that narrative is an ontological condition of social life.​[41]​

“Identity is a place in the social world. A place is a metaphorical expression and stands for any position on any socially relevant dimension...In contrast to individual identity (I or me), collective identity (we or us) is a place that is shared with a group of other people,” and religious identity situates personal within collective and also allows personal identity to structure it through participation.​[42]​ The self-identification of 'Muslim' does not involve the individual in a place with other individuals, rather it is that which environs—it does not confirm a particularity of place but rather is the instantiation of that particularity.
IV.	Potential for Further Research
	This paper could be complemented with an inquiry into the more specific collective and personal identity of 'Muslim female' and the significance of combining these two collective identities as a strong statement of personal identity. Bloul remarks on her article, “The focus of in this article is deliberately on men. Although women, and most notably Beurettes, have been involved in Maghrebi collective action in France, they have been relatively invisible in contrast to men, who create a Muslim collective identity as generically male.”​[43]​ The religious collective identity discussed above is not necessarily marked as male, but a more in-depth look would be interesting in order to determine whether the above implies a gendered collective.
	In his writing on Hindi nationalism, Devji discusses the significance of a marked collective:
Unlike the deracialized 'good' Muslim who was welcomed into the ranks of secular nationalism, therefore, the Muslim today, whether bad or good, is increasingly someone who can be  immediately identified 'racially' - by appearance as stigma alone rather than by any difference which could become the basis of a moral community and so of self-determination. And this anxiety to fix Muslimhood on the body takes on a somewhat Nazi tone when, during pogroms, the identity of men who deny their Muslimhood is determined by checking if they have been circumcised. Racism is when life hangs upon a foreskin.​[44]​

The incendiary language Devji uses serves a shock factor for the reader and brings up the question of physically expressed religious collective identity. The above treatment dealt with psychological, emotional, and other social expression but did not include what it means for the body to self-identify into a particular category.
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